PH_Rule_Flow_204
Enabled
Detects unusual ( more than 10 in 3 minutes) ICMP types, namely other than echo request/reply and destination unreachables
7
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005No Technique Specified
Network
FortiGate via Syslog or Netflow,Checkpoint via Syslog or Netflow, Palo Alto via Syslog or Netflow
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
180 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 180 second time window.
UnusualIcmp
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
ipProto = 1 AND icmpType NOT IN (0,3,8) AND eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_PermitNetTraffic, Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_NetflowTraffic, Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_BiNetflowTraffic)
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
srcIpAddr,icmpType
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) > 10
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
srcIpAddr = UnusualIcmp.srcIpAddr,
icmpType = UnusualIcmp.icmpType,
incidentCount = UnusualIcmp.COUNT(*)