PH_Rule_SIGMA_2520
Enabled
Detects the stopping of a Windows service. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_stop_service.yml
3
Security
Impact
Impact consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt availability or compromise integrity by manipulating business and operational processes. Techniques used for impact can include destroying or tampering with data. In some cases, business processes can look fine, but may have been altered to benefit the adversaries’ goals. These techniques might be used by adversaries to follow through on their end goal or to provide cover for a confidentiality breach.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040T1489
Service Stop
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND ((srcFileName="sc.exe" OR procName REGEXP "\\sc\.exe$") AND command REGEXP ".* stop .*") AND ((command NOT IN ("sc stop KSCWebConsoleMessageQueue","sc stop LGHUBUpdaterService") OR user NOT REGEXP ".*AUTHORI.*|.*AUTORI.*"))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
command,hostName,procName,srcFileName,user
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
command = Filter.command,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
srcFileName = Filter.srcFileName,
user = Filter.user