PH_Rule_SIGMA_1197
Enabled
Detect potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers remotely to move laterally in a network. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_scrcons_remote_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml
7
Security
Persistence
Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that let them maintain their foothold on systems, such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003T1546.003
Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003Server
Windows Security Log via OMI or FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
Cobalt Strike / Meterpreter are intended to be used by penetration testers and security red teams to simulate a real cyberthreat. Investigate whether the user needs to really run Cobalt Strike or Meterpreter. Investigate what other incidents are occurring on that host during that time frame. If necessary, rebuild the host from a known, good source and have the user change their password.
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
(eventType="Win-Security-4624" AND winLogonType=3 AND procName REGEXP "scrcons\.exe$") AND (winLogonId!="0x3e7")
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hostName,procName,winLogonId,winLogonType
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
winLogonId = Filter.winLogonId,
winLogonType = Filter.winLogonType