PH_RULE_Kaseya_REvil_SuspiciousFileHash_Network
Enabled
Malware hash known to be associated with REvil Ransomware activity detected by Fortinet Products on network. These indicators were seen during the Kaseya VSA Supply Chain Attack.
9
Security
Initial Access
Initial Access consists of techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their initial foothold within a network. Techniques used to gain a foothold include targeted spearphishing and exploiting weaknesses on public-facing web servers. Footholds gained through initial access may allow for continued access, like valid accounts and use of external remote services, or may be limited-use due to changing passwords.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001T1195.002
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002Network
FortiGate via Syslog
Correlation
Check if the source is patched for the CVE associated with the event. If yes then remove the host from the network and patch immediately. If host is not scanned then determine if the host is running the affected version of the application. If yes then patch immediately, else it is likely a false positive.
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
revil
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_FortiGate_AV_Detected) AND ( hashMD5 IN ("939aae3cc456de8964cb182c75a5f8cc","561cffbaba71a6e8cc1cdceda990ead4","a47cf00aedf769d60d58bfe00c0b5421","7ea501911850a077cf0f9fe6a7518859","0299e3c2536543885860c7b61e1efc3f","835f242dde220cc76ee5544119562268","849fb558745e4089a8232312594b21d2","561cffbaba71a6e8cc1cdceda990ead4","4a91cb0705539e1d09108c60f991ffcf","7d1807850275485397ce2bb218eff159","8535397007ecb56d666b666c3592c26d","5a97a50e45e64db41049fd88a75f2dd2","040818b1b3c9b1bf8245f5bcb4eebbbc","be6c46239e9c753de227bf1f3428e271","a560890b8af60b9824c73be74ef24a46","a47cf00aedf769d60d58bfe00c0b5421","18786bfac1be0ddf23ff94c029ca4d63") OR hashSHA1 IN ("3c2b0dcdb2a46fc1ec0a12a54309e35621caa925","656c4d285ea518d90c1b669b79af475db31e30b1","c2bb3eef783c18d9825134dc8b6e9cc261d4cca7","e1d689bf92ff338752b8ae5a2e8d75586ad2b67b","682389250d914b95d6c23ab29dffee11cb65cae9","8118474606a68c03581eef85a05a90275aa1ec24","1bcf1ae39b898aaa8b6b0207d7e307b234614ff6","5162f14d75e96edb914d1756349d6e11583db0b0","7895e4d017c3ed5edb9bf92c156316b4990361eb","45c1b556f5a875b71f2286e1ed4c7bd32e705758","0912b7cecfbe82d6903a8a0dc421c285480e5caa","20e3a0955baca4dc7f1f36d3b865e632474add77","c0f569fc22cb5dd8e02e44f85168b4b72a6669c3","13d57aba8df4c95185c1a6d2f945d65795ee825b") OR hashSHA256 IN ("589C8E3CF270FB6AEE9BAD137A20C733F77A3AE190E8DDE29680878FFA07B824","45AEBD60E3C4ED8D3285907F5BF6C71B3B60A9BCB7C34E246C20410CF678FC0C","36a71c6ac77db619e18f701be47d79306459ff1550b0c92da47b8c46e2ec0752","e2a24ab94f865caeacdf2c3ad015f31f23008ac6db8312c2cbfb32e4a5466ea2","df2d6ef0450660aaae62c429610b964949812df2da1c57646fc29aa51c3f031e","dc6b0e8c1e9c113f0364e1c8370060dee3fcbe25b667ddeca7623a95cd21411f","d8353cfc5e696d3ae402c7c70565c1e7f31e49bcf74a6e12e5ab044f306b4b20","d55f983c994caa160ec63a59f6b4250fe67fb3e8c43a388aec60a4a6978e9f1e","d5ce6f36a06b0dc8ce8e7e2c9a53e66094c2adfc93cfac61dd09efe9ac45a75f","cc0cdc6a3d843e22c98170713abf1d6ae06e8b5e34ed06ac3159adafe85e3bd6","aae6e388e774180bc3eb96dad5d5bfefd63d0eb7124d68b6991701936801f1c7","66490c59cb9630b53fa3fa7125b5c9511afde38edab4459065938c1974229ca8","0496ca57e387b10dfdac809de8a4e039f68e8d66535d5d19ec76d39f7d0a4402","81d0c71f8b282076cd93fb6bb5bfd3932422d033109e2c92572fc49e4abc2471","8e846ed965bbc0270a6f58c5818e039ef2fb78def4d2bf82348ca786ea0cea4f","8dd620d9aeb35960bb766458c8890ede987c33d239cf730f93fe49d90ae759dd","1fe9b489c25bb23b04d9996e8107671edee69bd6f6def2fe7ece38a0fb35f98e"))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
destIpAddr,srcIpAddr
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
srcIpAddr=revil.srcIpAddr,
destIpAddr=revil.destIpAddr