FortiEDR: Suspicious Process Detected

Rule ID

PH_RULE_FEDR_SuspiciousProc_Detected

Default Status

Enabled

Description

FortiEDR detected a suspicious process on a host, but did not block it.

Severity

MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics

Execution

Execution consists of techniques that result in adversary-controlled code running on a local or remote system. Techniques that run malicious code are often paired with techniques from all other tactics to achieve broader goals, like exploring a network or stealing data. For example, an adversary might use a remote access tool to run a PowerShell script that does Remote System Discovery.

https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

T1204.002

User Execution: Malicious File

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002

Impacts

Server

Data Source

FortiEDR via Syslog

Detection

Correlation

Remediation Guidance

Investigate the given host and scan for malware. Determine the origin of the executed process or file and determine if legitimate.

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

300 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.

threat

SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: threat

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType = "FortiEDR-Security-Suspicious-Logging"

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID

hostName,hostIpAddr,procPath, procName, user

Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT(*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

 hostName=threat.hostName,
hostIpAddr=threat.hostIpAddr,
 user = threat.user,
 procPath = threat.procPath,
 procName = threat.procName,
 incidentCount=threat.COUNT(*)

FortiSIEM Rules