PH_Rule_ES_IMPORT_AWS_7
Enabled
Identifies attempts to delete an AWS Config Service rule. An adversary may tamper with Config rules in order to reduce visibility into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances.
7
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1562.006
Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006Server
AWS CloudTrail via AWS_CLOUDTRAIL
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType CONTAIN "AWS-CloudTrail-CONFIG-DeleteConfigRule"
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
accountId,user
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
accountId = Filter.accountId,
user = Filter.user