PH_Rule_Change_10
Disabled
Detects that a user successfully modified either the content or the attributes of a file or directory
5
Security
Collection
Collection consists of techniques adversaries may use to gather information and the sources information is collected from that are relevant to following through on the adversary's objectives. Frequently, the next goal after collecting data is to steal (exfiltrate) the data. Common target sources include various drive types, browsers, audio, video, and email. Common collection methods include capturing screenshots and keyboard input.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009T1005
Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005T1565.001
Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001Server
Windows Security log via OMI or FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
FileAccessSuccess
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_FileChange) AND reptDevIpAddr IN (Group@PH_SYS_DEVICE_WINDOWS_SERVER) AND eventAction = 0 AND user NOT CONTAIN "$"
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
user,domain,osObjName,reptDevIpAddr,reptDevName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = FileAccessSuccess.reptDevName,
user = FileAccessSuccess.user,
domain = FileAccessSuccess.domain,
fileName = FileAccessSuccess.osObjName