PH_Rule_SIGMA_279
Enabled
Detects DCShadow via create new SPN. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_possible_dc_shadow.yml
5
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1207
Rogue Domain Controller
Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207Server
Windows Security Log via OMI or FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
(eventType="Win-Security-4742" AND principal REGEXP ".*GC/.*") OR (eventType="Win-Security-5136" AND propName="servicePrincipalName" AND propValue REGEXP "^GC/")
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hostName,principal,propName,propValue
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.hostName,
principal = Filter.principal,
propName = Filter.propName,
propValue = Filter.propValue