PH_RULE_MS_DefEndpoint_Alert_DefEvasion_ProcInject
Enabled
Process Injection - Defense Evasion Alert from MS 365 Defender
9
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1055.001
Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001Network
MS 365 Defender via HTTPS_ADVANCED (Graph API) ,Azure Event Hub via AZURE_PYTHON_SDK
Correlation
Investigate the alert and determine if the observed behavior was legitimate.
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
ms_defender_alert
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
(eventType = "MS-Defender-Endpoint-Alert-DefenseEvasion" OR eventType CONTAIN "M365Defender-Alert") AND attackTechniqueId = "T1055"
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
alertIdStr,alertName,tenantId
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
alertName=ms_defender_alert.alertName,
alertIdStr=ms_defender_alert.alertIdStr,
tenantId=ms_defender_alert.tenantId,
incidentCount=ms_defender_alert.COUNT(*)