PH_Rule_SIGMA_1857
Enabled
Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_successful_external_remote_smb_login.yml
7
Security
Initial Access
Initial Access consists of techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their initial foothold within a network. Techniques used to gain a foothold include targeted spearphishing and exploiting weaknesses on public-facing web servers. Footholds gained through initial access may allow for continued access, like valid accounts and use of external remote services, or may be limited-use due to changing passwords.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001T1133
External Remote Services
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133Server
Windows Security Log via OMI or FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Security-4624" AND winLogonType=3 AND srcIpAddr!=::1 AND srcIpAddr NOT IN (Group@PH_SYS_NETWORK_ENTERPRISE_INTERNAL_NET)
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hostName,srcIpAddr,winLogonType
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.hostName,
srcIpAddr = Filter.srcIpAddr,
winLogonType = Filter.winLogonType