PH_RULE_BURNTCIGAR_MS_Driver_Malware_Net
Enabled
BURNTCIGAR Microsoft Signed Driver Malware detected on network
9
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1036.001
Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature
Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001Network
FortiGate via Syslog
Correlation
Check if the source is patched for the CVE associated with the event. If yes then remove the host from the network and patch immediately. If host is not scanned then determine if the host is running the affected version of the application. If yes then patch immediately, else it is likely a false positive.
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
threat
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_FortiGate_AV_Detected) AND ipsSignatureId IN (10116089,10115947) AND (srcIpAddr IN (Group@PH_SYS_NETWORK_ENTERPRISE_INTERNAL_NET) OR (destIpAddr IN (Group@PH_SYS_NETWORK_ENTERPRISE_INTERNAL_NET) AND fwAction NOT IN ("deny","dropped","block","blocked","ban-ip","alert_deny")))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
srcIpAddr,destIpAddr
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
srcIpAddr=threat.srcIpAddr,
destIpAddr=threat.destIpAddr,
incidentCount=threat.COUNT(*)