PH_Rule_SIGMA_93
Enabled
Detect scenarios where a potentially unauthorized application or user is modifying the system time. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_time_modification.yml
3
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1070.006
Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp
Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006Server
Windows Security Log via OMI or FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Security-4616" AND ((procName NOT IN ("C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\vmtoolsd.exe","C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe","C:\\Windows\\System32\\oobe\\msoobe.exe")) AND (procName!="C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" OR securityId!="S-1-5-19"))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hostName,procName,securityId
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
securityId = Filter.securityId