PH_Rule_SIGMA_1999
Enabled
Detects creation of the Process Monitor driver by processes other than Process Monitor (procmon) itself. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_sysinternals_procmon_driver_susp_creation.yml
5
Security
Privilege Escalation
Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect elevate privileges. An adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. They will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-11-FileCreate" AND (fileName REGEXP ".*\\procmon.*" AND fileName REGEXP "\.sys$") AND ((procName NOT REGEXP "\\procmon64\.exe$|\\procmon\.exe$"))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
fileName,hostName,procName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
fileName = Filter.fileName,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName