PH_Rule_Vuln_2
Enabled
Detects that host anti-virus or content inspection devices found a virus but could not remediate it
9
Security
Exfiltration
Exfiltration consists of techniques that adversaries may use to steal data from your network. Once they’ve collected data, adversaries often package it to avoid detection while removing it. This can include compression and encryption. Techniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041Server
FortiGate via Syslog, FortiProxy via Syslog, FortiEMS via Syslog, CrowdStrike Falcon via FALCON_STREAMING_API/FALCON_DATA_REPLICATOR, SentinelOne via Syslog, Symantec Endpoint Protection Service via Syslog, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint via HTTPS_ADVANCED, FortiEDR via Syslog, Cisco FireAMP via ESTREAMER_SDK/FIREAMP_CLOUD_API,Palo Alto Traps Endpoint Security Manager via Syslog, Carbon Black Security Platform via Syslog, Cylance Protect via Syslog
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
VirusFound
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_Worm_Remedy_Failed, Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_GenMalware_Remedy_Failed) AND reptDevIpAddr IN (Group@PH_SYS_APP_SEC_MGMT,Group@PH_SYS_DEVICE_SEC_GW)
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
computer,virusName,fileName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName=VirusFound.computer,
virusName = VirusFound.virusName,
fileName = VirusFound.fileName