PH_Rule_TH_ES_WINDOWS_1
Enabled
Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows SxS local folder. Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads by instructing the Windows module loader to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths.
5
Security
Execution
Execution consists of techniques that result in adversary-controlled code running on a local or remote system. Techniques that run malicious code are often paired with techniques from all other tactics to achieve broader goals, like exploring a network or stealing data. For example, an adversary might use a remote access tool to run a PowerShell script that does Remote System Discovery.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002T1129
Shared Modules
Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType = "Win-Sysmon-11-FileCreate" AND fileName CONTAIN "dll" AND filePath REGEXP "C:\\.*\\.*\.exe\.local\\.*\.dll"
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hostName,eventType,fileName,filePath,user
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.hostName,
compEventType = Filter.eventType,
fileName = Filter.fileName,
filePath = Filter.filePath,
user = Filter.user