PH_Rule_SIGMA_1305
Enabled
Detects dropping of dll files in system32 that may be used to retrieve user credentials from Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS.exe), which manages system-level authentication. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_credential_access_via_password_filter.yml
5
Security
Credential Access
Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords. Techniques used to get credentials include keylogging or credential dumping. Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006T1556.002
Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter DLL
Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
Determine if this was an authorized penetration testing activity. Otherwise, there is no reason for this activity to be occurring. The host should be quarantined and investigated immediately. Collect the process hash and check for malware match. Investigate what other incidents are occurring on that host during that time frame.
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND command REGEXP ".*HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa.*" AND command REGEXP ".*scecli\\0.*" AND command REGEXP ".*reg add.*"
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
command,hostName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
command = Filter.command,
hostName = Filter.hostName