PH_Rule_SIGMA_392
Enabled
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_control_panel_item.yml
7
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1218.002
Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Control Panel
Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Phishing campaigns or executed as part of multi-stage malware. Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND (((procName REGEXP "\\reg\.exe$" OR srcFileName="reg.exe") AND (command REGEXP ".*add.*" AND command REGEXP ".*CurrentVersion\\Control Panel\\CPLs.*")) OR (command REGEXP "\.cpl$" AND ((command NOT REGEXP ".*%System%.*|.*\\System32\\.*") AND (command NOT REGEXP ".*regsvr32 .*" OR command NOT REGEXP ".* /s .*" OR command NOT REGEXP ".*igfxCPL\.cpl.*"))))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
command,hostName,procName,srcFileName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
command = Filter.command,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
srcFileName = Filter.srcFileName