PH_Rule_Stat_23
Enabled
Detects a sudden 50% increase of successful logons to a host over a 30 minute window
7
Security
Initial Access
Initial Access consists of techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their initial foothold within a network. Techniques used to gain a foothold include targeted spearphishing and exploiting weaknesses on public-facing web servers. Footholds gained through initial access may allow for continued access, like valid accounts and use of external remote services, or may be limited-use due to changing passwords.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001T1078.003
Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003Server
Login Data
Profiling
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
1800 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 1800 second time window.
Logon
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_HostLogonSuccess)
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
reptDevName,reptDevIpAddr
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 20 AND
COUNT(*) >= 1.50 * STAT_AVG(COUNT(*):115)
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Logon.reptDevName,
hostIpAddr = Logon.reptDevIpAddr,
count = Logon.COUNT(*),
avgMatchedEvents = Logon.STAT_AVG(COUNT(*):115)