PH_Rule_OSQ_WIN_4
Enabled
Detects common windows processes not running from their well-known path. Processes checked are: Console Windows Host process (Conhost.exe), Client Server Runtime Subsystem (csrss.exe), File explorer (explorer.exe), Dllhost.exe, Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lssass.exe), Service Control Manager Service (services.exe), Session Manager Subsystem (smss.exe), Shared Service Process (svchost.exe), Windows startup initialization process (wininit.exe), Logon/logoff Management service (winlogon.exe), WMI Provider service (wmiprvse.exe)
8
Security
Persistence
Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that let them maintain their foothold on systems, such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003T1037.001
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)
Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001Server
The following Windows osqueries via FortiSIEM Agent: windows_conhost.exe_incorrect_path, windows_csrss.exe_incorrect_path, windows_explorer.exe_incorrect_path, windows_dllhost.exe_incorrect_path, Windows_lsass.exe_incorrect_path, Windows_services.exe_incorrect_path, Windows_smss.exe_incorrect_path, Windows_svchost.exe_incorrect_path, Windows_wininit.exe_incorrect_path, Windows_winlogon.exe_incorrect_path, Windows_wmiprvse.exe_incorrect_path
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN ("PH_OSQUERY_WIN_CONHOST_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_CSRSS_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_EXPLORER_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_DLLHOST_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_LSASS_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_SERVICES_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_SMSS_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_SVCHOST_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_WININIT_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_WINLOGIN_BAD_PATH", "PH_OSQUERY_WIN_WMIPRVSE_BAD_PATH") AND totalNum >= 1
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
reptDevName,procName,filePath
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.reptDevName,
procName = Filter.procName,
filePath = Filter.filePath