PH_Rule_SIGMA_913
Enabled
Detects the load of the Windiver driver, a powerful user-mode capture/sniffing/modification/blocking/re-injection package for Windows. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_win_windivert.yml
7
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1599.001
Network Boundary Bridging: Network Address Translation Traversal
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device's Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. Adversaries may use Patch System Image to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-6-Driver-Loaded" AND (loadedProcName REGEXP ".*\\NordDivert\.sys.*|.*\\WinDivert64\.sys.*|.*\\WinDivert\.sys.*|.*\\eswfp\.sys.*|.*\\lingtiwfp\.sys.*" OR hashCode REGEXP ".*IMPHASH=0604bb7cb4bb851e2168d5c7d9399087.*|.*IMPHASH=0ea54f8c9af4a2fe8367fa457f48ed38.*|.*IMPHASH=2a5f85fe4609461c6339637594fa9b0a.*|.*IMPHASH=2e5f0e649d97f32b03c09e4686d0574f.*|.*IMPHASH=45ee545ae77e8d43fc70ede9efcd4c96.*|.*IMPHASH=52f8aa269f69f0edad9e8fcdaedce276.*|.*IMPHASH=58623490691babe8330adc81cd04a663.*|.*IMPHASH=6b2c6f95233c2914d1d488ee27531acc.*|.*IMPHASH=8ee39b48656e4d6b8459d7ba7da7438b.*|.*IMPHASH=9d519ae0a0864d6d6ae3f8b6c9c70af6.*|.*IMPHASH=9f2fdd3f9ab922bbb0560a7df46f4342.*|.*IMPHASH=a1b2e245acd47e4a348e1a552a02859a.*|.*IMPHASH=a66b476c2d06c370f0a53b5537f2f11e.*|.*IMPHASH=a74929edfc3289895e3f2885278947ae.*|.*IMPHASH=bdcd836a46bc2415773f6b5ea77a46e4.*|.*IMPHASH=c0e5d314da39dbf65a2dbff409cc2c76.*|.*IMPHASH=c28cd6ccd83179e79dac132a553693d9.*|.*IMPHASH=d8a719865c448b1bd2ec241e46ac1c88.*" OR hashIMP IN ("0604bb7cb4bb851e2168d5c7d9399087","0ea54f8c9af4a2fe8367fa457f48ed38","2a5f85fe4609461c6339637594fa9b0a","2e5f0e649d97f32b03c09e4686d0574f","45ee545ae77e8d43fc70ede9efcd4c96","52f8aa269f69f0edad9e8fcdaedce276","58623490691babe8330adc81cd04a663","6b2c6f95233c2914d1d488ee27531acc","8ee39b48656e4d6b8459d7ba7da7438b","9d519ae0a0864d6d6ae3f8b6c9c70af6","9f2fdd3f9ab922bbb0560a7df46f4342","a1b2e245acd47e4a348e1a552a02859a","a66b476c2d06c370f0a53b5537f2f11e","a74929edfc3289895e3f2885278947ae","bdcd836a46bc2415773f6b5ea77a46e4","c0e5d314da39dbf65a2dbff409cc2c76","c28cd6ccd83179e79dac132a553693d9","d8a719865c448b1bd2ec241e46ac1c88"))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hashCode,hashIMP,hostName,loadedProcName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hashCode = Filter.hashCode,
hashIMP = Filter.hashIMP,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
loadedProcName = Filter.loadedProcName