PH_Rule_SIGMA_2379
Enabled
Detects the use of Setres.exe to set the screen resolution and then potentially launch a file named "choice" (with any executable extension such as ".cmd" or ".exe") from the current execution path. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_setres.yml
5
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1202
Indirect Command Execution
Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. Adversaries may abuse these features for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND parentProcName REGEXP "\\setres\.exe$" AND procName REGEXP "\\choice$"
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hostName,parentProcName,procName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.hostName,
parentProcName = Filter.parentProcName,
procName = Filter.procName