PH_Rule_SIGMA_2513
Enabled
Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie. This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server) or potentially a sign of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397 . This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_webdav_client_susp_execution.yml
7
Security
Exfiltration
Exfiltration consists of techniques that adversaries may use to steal data from your network. Once they’ve collected data, adversaries often package it to avoid detection while removing it. This can include compression and encryption. Techniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010T1048.003
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND (parentProcName REGEXP "\\svchost\.exe$" AND parentCommand REGEXP ".*-s WebClient.*" AND procName REGEXP "\\rundll32\.exe$" AND command REGEXP ".*C:\\windows\\system32\\davclnt\.dll,DavSetCookie.*" AND command REGEXP "://\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}") AND ((command NOT REGEXP ".*://10\..*|.*://127\..*|.*://169\.254\..*|.*://172\.16\..*|.*://172\.17\..*|.*://172\.18\..*|.*://172\.19\..*|.*://172\.20\..*|.*://172\.21\..*|.*://172\.22\..*|.*://172\.23\..*|.*://172\.24\..*|.*://172\.25\..*|.*://172\.26\..*|.*://172\.27\..*|.*://172\.28\..*|.*://172\.29\..*|.*://172\.30\..*|.*://172\.31\..*|.*://192\.168\..*"))
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
command,hostName,parentCommand,parentProcName,procName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
command = Filter.command,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
parentCommand = Filter.parentCommand,
parentProcName = Filter.parentProcName,
procName = Filter.procName