FortiSIEM Rules

Windows: Suspicious LSASS Access Via MalSecLogon

Rule ID


Default Status



Detects suspicious access to Lsass handle via a call trace to seclogon.dll. The process known as Secondary Logon Service DLL, distributed by Microsoft, allows a user to start a command or application with a different account's credentials, such as an administrator working on another user's computer, only using their administrative account to run certain commands or applications. This rule is adapted from






Credential Access

Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords. Techniques used to get credentials include keylogging or credential dumping. Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques


OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).



Data Source

Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent



Remediation Guidance

Mimikatz is intended to be used by penetration testers and security red teams to simulate a real cyberthreat. Investigate whether the user needs to really run Mimikatz. Investigate what other incidents are occurring on that host during that time frame. If necessary, rebuild the host from a known, good source and have the user change their password.

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

300 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.


SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: Filter

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType="Win-Sysmon-10-ProcessAccess" AND targetProcName REGEXP "\\lsass\.exe$" AND procName REGEXP "\\svchost\.exe$" AND accessKeyId="0x14c0" AND procPath REGEXP ".*seclogon\.dll.*"

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID


Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT(*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

accessKeyId = Filter.accessKeyId,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
procPath = Filter.procPath,
targetProcName = Filter.targetProcName