PH_Rule_SIGMA_91
Enabled
Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_sdelete.yml
5
Security
Defense Evasion
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005T1070.004
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity to minimize the adversary's footprint. Tools such as cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools can be used.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004T1027.005
Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools
Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005Server
Windows Security Log via OMI or FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN ("Win-Security-4656","Win-Security-4658","Win-Security-4663") AND osObjName REGEXP "\.AAA$|\.ZZZ$"
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
hostName,osObjName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
hostName = Filter.hostName,
osObjName = Filter.osObjName