FortiSIEM Rules

Suspicious logon attempt

Rule ID


Default Status



Detects suspicious logon attempts that indicate policy violations, e.g. root logon to database servers, default passwords, attempts to bypass authentication, root logon over unencrypted protocols such as Telnet, ftp, anonymous logons etc.






Credential Access

Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords. Techniques used to get credentials include keylogging or credential dumping. Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques


Brute Force: Password Guessing

Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts.



Data Source

AWS Security Hub via AWS_HUB_SDK, FortiDeceptor via Syslog



Remediation Guidance

No remediation guidance specified

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

600 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 600 second time window.


SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: SuspiciousLogon

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_SuspiciousLogon)

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID

srcIpAddr, reptDevIpAddr, reptDevName

Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT (*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

 srcIpAddr = SuspiciousLogon.srcIpAddr,
 destName = SuspiciousLogon.reptDevName,
 destIpAddr = SuspiciousLogon.reptDevIpAddr,
 incidentCount = SuspiciousLogon.COUNT(*)