PH_Rule_SIGMA_2509
Enabled
load malicious registered COM objects. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_registered_com_objects.yml
7
Security
Persistence
Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that let them maintain their foothold on systems, such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003T1546.015
Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015Server
Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent
Correlation
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
300 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.
Filter
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND (procName REGEXP "\\rundll32\.exe$" OR srcFileName="RUNDLL32.EXE") AND (command REGEXP ".*-localserver .*|.*-sta .*" AND command REGEXP ".*\{.*" AND command REGEXP ".*\}.*")
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
command,hostName,procName,srcFileName
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
COUNT(*) >= 1
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
command = Filter.command,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
srcFileName = Filter.srcFileName