FortiSIEM Rules

Windows: Register new Logon Process by Rubeus

Rule ID

PH_Rule_SIGMA_287

Default Status

Enabled

Description

Detects potential use of Rubeus via registered new trusted logon process. Rubeus is a toolkit for Kerberos interaction and abuses. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_register_new_logon_process_by_rubeus.yml

Severity

9

Category

Security

MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics

Credential Access

Credential Access consists of techniques for stealing credentials like account names and passwords. Techniques used to get credentials include keylogging or credential dumping. Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals.

https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques


T1558.003

Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting

Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable Pass the Ticket. Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force. Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003

Impacts

Server

Data Source

Windows Security Log via OMI or FortiSIEM Agent

Detection

Correlation

Remediation Guidance

Rubeus is intended to be used by penetration testers and security red teams to simulate a real cyberthreat. Investigate whether the user needs to really run Rubeus. Investigate what other incidents are occurring on that host during that time frame. If necessary, rebuild the host from a known, good source and have the user change their password.

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

300 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.

Filter

SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: Filter

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType="Win-Security-4611" AND winLogonProc="User32LogonProcesss"

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID

hostName,winLogonProc

Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT(*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

 hostName = Filter.hostName,
winLogonProc = Filter.winLogonProc