FortiSIEM Rules

Windows: Impacket Tool Execution

Rule ID


Default Status



Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives). This rule is adapted from







Collection consists of techniques adversaries may use to gather information and the sources information is collected from that are relevant to following through on the adversary's objectives. Frequently, the next goal after collecting data is to steal (exfiltrate) the data. Common target sources include various drive types, browsers, audio, video, and email. Common collection methods include capturing screenshots and keyboard input.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques


Man-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation. By responding to Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.



Data Source

Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent



Remediation Guidance

No remediation guidance specified

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

300 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.


SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: Filter

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND (procName REGEXP ".*\\goldenPac.*|.*\\karmaSMB.*|.*\\kintercept.*|.*\\ntlmrelayx.*|.*\\rpcdump.*|.*\\samrdump.*|.*\\secretsdump.*|.*\\smbexec.*|.*\\smbrelayx.*|.*\\wmiexec.*|.*\\wmipersist.*" OR procName REGEXP "\\GetADUsers_windows\.exe$|\\GetNPUsers_windows\.exe$|\\GetUserSPNs_windows\.exe$|\\atexec_windows\.exe$|\\dcomexec_windows\.exe$|\\dpapi_windows\.exe$|\\findDelegation_windows\.exe$|\\getPac_windows\.exe$|\\getST_windows\.exe$|\\getTGT_windows\.exe$|\\ifmap_windows\.exe$|\\mimikatz_windows\.exe$|\\netview_windows\.exe$|\\nmapAnswerMachine_windows\.exe$|\\opdump_windows\.exe$|\\psexec_windows\.exe$|\\rdp_check_windows\.exe$|\\sambaPipe_windows\.exe$|\\smbclient_windows\.exe$|\\smbserver_windows\.exe$|\\sniff_windows\.exe$|\\sniffer_windows\.exe$|\\split_windows\.exe$|\\ticketer_windows\.exe$")

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID


Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT(*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName