FortiSIEM Rules

Windows: HackTool - PPID Spoofing SelectMyParent Tool Execution

Rule ID


Default Status



Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent. This rule is adapted from






Defense Evasion

Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques


Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing

Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be explorer.exe



Data Source

Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent



Remediation Guidance

No remediation guidance specified

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

300 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.


SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: Filter

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND (procName REGEXP "\\SelectMyParent\.exe$" OR command REGEXP ".* -spawnto .*|.*PPID-spoof.*|.*ppid_spoof.*|.*ppidspoof.*|.*spoof-ppid.*|.*spoof_ppid.*|.*spoofedppid.*|.*spoofppid.*" OR srcFileName REGEXP ".*PPID-spoof.*|.*ppid_spoof.*|.*ppidspoof.*|.*spoof-ppid.*|.*spoof_ppid.*|.*spoofedppid.*|.*spoofppid.*" OR description="SelectMyParent" OR hashIMP IN ("04d974875bd225f00902b4cad9af3fbc","89059503d7fbf470e68f7e63313da3ad","a782af154c9e743ddf3f3eb2b8f3d16e","ca28337632625c8281ab8a130b3d6bad") OR hashCode REGEXP ".*IMPHASH=04D974875BD225F00902B4CAD9AF3FBC.*|.*IMPHASH=89059503D7FBF470E68F7E63313DA3AD.*|.*IMPHASH=A782AF154C9E743DDF3F3EB2B8F3D16E.*|.*IMPHASH=CA28337632625C8281AB8A130B3D6BAD.*")

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID


Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT(*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

command = Filter.command,
description = Filter.description,
hashCode = Filter.hashCode,
hashIMP = Filter.hashIMP,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
srcFileName = Filter.srcFileName