FortiSIEM Rules

Windows: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet

Rule ID


Default Status



Detects usage of a base64 encoded "FromBase64String" cmdlet in a process command line. This rule is adapted from






Defense Evasion

Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics’ techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques


Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information]( to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system. One such example is use of [certutil]( to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution]( The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)



Data Source

Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent



Remediation Guidance

No remediation guidance specified

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

300 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.


SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: Filter

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType="Win-Sysmon-1-Create-Process" AND (command REGEXP ".*6OkZyb21CYXNlNjRTdHJpbm.*|.*OjpGcm9tQmFzZTY0U3RyaW5n.*|.*o6RnJvbUJhc2U2NFN0cmluZ.*" OR command REGEXP ".*6ADoARgByAG8AbQBCAGEAcwBlADYANABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZw.*|.*OgA6AEYAcgBvAG0AQgBhAHMAZQA2ADQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcA.*|.*oAOgBGAHIAbwBtAEIAYQBzAGUANgA0AFMAdAByAGkAbgBnA.*")

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID


Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT(*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

command = Filter.command,
hostName = Filter.hostName