FortiSIEM Rules

Windows: DLL Load via LSASS

Rule ID

PH_Rule_SIGMA_671

Default Status

Enabled

Description

Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key. This rule is adapted from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_lsass_dll_load.yml

Severity

7

Category

Security

MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics

Persistence

Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that let them maintain their foothold on systems, such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code.

https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques


T1547.008

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: LSASS Driver

Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., Hijack Execution Flow), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008

Impacts

Server

Data Source

Windows Sysmon via FortiSIEM Agent

Detection

Correlation

Remediation Guidance

No remediation guidance specified

Time Window

If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.

300 seconds

Trigger Conditions

If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 300 second time window.

Filter

SubPattern Definitions

SubPattern Name: Filter

This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.

SubPattern Query

This is the query logic that matches incoming events

eventType REGEXP "Win-Sysmon-12-Registry-.*|Win-Sysmon-13-Registry-.*|Win-Sysmon-14-Registry-.*" AND regKeyPath REGEXP ".*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\DirectoryServiceExtPt.*|.*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\LsaDbExtPt.*" AND ((procName!="C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe" OR details NOT IN ("%%systemroot%%\\system32\\lsadb.dll","%%systemroot%%\\system32\\ntdsa.dll")))

Group by Attributes

This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID

details,hostName,procName,regKeyPath

Aggregate Constraint

This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident

COUNT(*) >= 1

Incident Attribute Mapping

This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.

The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern

details = Filter.details,
hostName = Filter.hostName,
procName = Filter.procName,
regKeyPath = Filter.regKeyPath