PH_Rule_Stat_5
Enabled
Detects traffic anomaly on outbound TCP/UDP port usage. Detects traffic anomaly on outbound TCP/UDP port usage on a firewall. This means that over a 30 minute time window, the permitted outbound traffic (both number of flows and total bytes) to a specific TCP/UDP port is more than 3 standard deviations away than the average for the current hour.
7
Security
Impact
Impact consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt availability or compromise integrity by manipulating business and operational processes. Techniques used for impact can include destroying or tampering with data. In some cases, business processes can look fine, but may have been altered to benefit the adversaries’ goals. These techniques might be used by adversaries to follow through on their end goal or to provide cover for a confidentiality breach.
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040T1498.001
Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood
Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001Network
FortiGate via Syslog or Netflow, Cisco IOS via Syslog or Netflow, Checkpoint via Syslog or Netflow, Palo Alto via Syslog or Netflow
Profiling
No remediation guidance specified
If the following pattern or patterns match an ingested event within the given time window in seconds, trigger an incident.
1800 seconds
If the following defined pattern/s occur within a 1800 second time window.
StatHighPort
This is the named definition of the event query, this is important if multiple subpatterns are defined to distinguish them.
This is the query logic that matches incoming events
eventType IN (Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_PermitNetTraffic, Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_NetflowTraffic, Group@PH_SYS_EVENT_BiNetflowTraffic) AND
reptDevIpAddr IN (Group@PH_SYS_DEVICE_FIREWALL) AND
srcIpAddr IN (Group@PH_SYS_NETWORK_ENTERPRISE_INTERNAL_NET)
This defines how matching events are aggregated, only events with the same matching attribute values are grouped into one unique incident ID
destIpPort,ipProto
This is most typically a numerical constraint that defines when the rule should trigger an incident
(SUM(totFlows)-STAT_AVG(SUM(totFlows):105))/STAT_STDDEV(SUM(totFlows):105) >= 3 AND
(SUM(totBytes64)-STAT_AVG(SUM(totBytes64):105))/STAT_STDDEV(SUM(totBytes64):105) >= 3 AND
STAT_STDDEV(SUM(totFlows):105) > 0 AND
STAT_STDDEV(SUM(totBytes64):105) > 0
This section defines which fields in matching raw events should be mapped to the incident attributes in the resulting incident.
The available raw event attributes to map are limited to the group by attributes and the aggregate event constraint fields for each subpattern
ipProto = StatHighPort.ipProto,
destIpPort = StatHighPort.destIpPort,
totFlows = StatHighPort.SUM(totFlows),
totBytes64 = StatHighPort.SUM(totBytes64),
avgTotFlows = StatHighPort.STAT_AVG(SUM(totFlows):105),
sdevTotFlows= StatHighPort.STAT_STDDEV(SUM(totFlows):105),
avgTotBytes64 = StatHighPort.STAT_AVG(SUM(totBytes64):105),
sdevTotBytes64 = StatHighPort.STAT_STDDEV(SUM(totBytes64):105)